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ARGUMENT 
I. FIRST AMERICAN AND COOK BOTH PROXIMATELY CAUSED 
HOLMES' DAMAGES BY PREPARING AND EXECUTING 
FAULTY DEEDS AND MISREPRESENTING COOK'S ABILITY TO 
CONVEY THE PROPERTY AT ISSUE. 
First American and Cook each argue in similar fashion that they did not 
cause Holmes' damages. Both point to the successful litigation and defense of 
Holmes' title pursuant to the policy of title insurance in support of such 
arguments. However, First American and Cook ignore the clear law of proximate 
cause and the fact that there can be more than one proximate cause of Holmes' 
damages. Because these arguments are intertwined with the issues of what duties 
each of the Defendants are charged with in this matter and whether or not said 
duties were subsequently breached, Holmes addresses these issues on an 
individual basis, Defendant by Defendant. 
A. First American Proximately Caused Holmes' Damages by Preparing 
Deeds That Made Holmes' Title Vulnerable and Subject to Attack. 
First American myopically assumes that the only duties it owed to Holmes 
are those outlined by the policy of title insurance it issued to Holmes at closing. 
Even if such were true, First American nevertheless breached its obligations in 
defending Holmes' title to the land in question and the issue of whether or not 
there was a breach is a question of fact that cannot be resolved by summary 
1 
proceedings. Saunders v. Sharp. 793 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah App. 1990) (issue of 
whether or not party breached its contractual obligations is a question of fact for 
the factfinder). 
First American fails to address in its Brief the argument asserted by Holmes 
in opposition to First American's Motion to Dismiss that the title insurance policy 
requires First American to take "appropriate action" in defense of Holmes' title 
and in honoring its contractual duties under the title insurance policy and that First 
American failed to take appropriate action when it prepared a flawed Special 
Warranty Deed that required litigation and a corrective affidavit to validate. (R. at 
85-86; T. at 27-28.) The same argument is clearly made in Holmes' initial 
Appellate Brief. See Holmes Brief, p. 16,20-26. 
Again, the question of whether or not First American took appropriate 
action is a question of fact. Brown v. Weis. 871 P.2d 552, 565 (Utah App. 1994) 
("whether a breach has occurred is generally one of fact, not law, and thus is 
ordinarily left to the jury or finder of fact.") (citations omitted). The trial court 
completely ignored this question in its ruling and order. (R. at 255-56, 261-65.) It 
also, in implicitly rejecting this argument, resolved a question of fact that was 
disputed by Holmes. Again, questions of fact that are material and disputed may 
not be resolved through summary judgment. Cache County v. Beus. 1999 UT 
2 
App 134, 978 P.2d 1043. The trial court erred in ignoring and/or rejecting out of 
hand Holmes' argument that First American did not take appropriate action to 
defend Holmes' title when it prepared a Special Warranty Deed that contained a 
clerical error and opened the door for an adverse claim to Holmes' title. 
It is also undisputed that First American's own errors1 set the stage for the 
eventual adverse claim to Holmes' title. First American prepared quit claim deeds 
designed to convey to Cook the interests of Lake Creek Farms and Lake Creek 
Associates in two parcels of real property eventually purchased by Holmes. (R. at 
29-30, 164.) One of these deeds was clearly and fatally flawed. Id First 
American failed to discover its own error in two subsequent closings involving the 
property Holmes purchased. (R. at 3, 164-65.) When it discovered its errors, First 
American attempted to remedy the defect in Holmes' title by preparing a Special 
Warranty Deed that contained a clerical error later exploited by parties adverse to 
Holmes' title. (R. at 3,166-67.) 
'First American and Cook conveniently construe Holmes' use of the term 
"negligence" to always imply a tort-based cause of action that is necessarily barred by the 
economic loss rule. To the contrary, Holmes' use of that term directly refers to the breach 
of contract and warranty claims raised by Holmes in its pleadings and arguments before 
the trial court. Put in simpler terms, Holmes does not believe Cook or First American 
intentionally caused Holmes' damages or purposefully breached their contractual 
obligations to Holmes. Instead, Holmes argues that Defendants' negligent behavior 
resulted in breaches of the contractual obligations and duties they each owed to Holmes. 
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This series of errors and lapses on First American's part placed Cook in a 
position where it was, at the very least, misled and under the erroneous 
assumption that it held with good title to the land it eventually sold to Holmes, 
even though three-fourths of the property was still owned by Lake Creek Farms, 
LLC, not Cook. It is less than genuine for First American to gloss over this fact 
and argue that it had nothing to do with the defect in Holmes' title when, but for 
First American's own mistakes, the Keystone litigation would not have been 
possible and the Warranty Deed from Cook to Holmes would have effectively 
conveyed title to Holmes. 
Utah law is clear that there can be more than one proximate cause of an 
injury. McCorvev v. UDOT. 868 P.2d 41,45 (Utah 1993); Steffensen v. Smith's 
Mgmt. Corp.. 820 P.2d 482,486 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Furthermore, the question 
of causation is one for the jury and is a question of fact, not law. Id. Therefore, 
First American's arguments about causation are just as inappropriate and 
irrelevant on appeal as they were before the trial court. In fact, the entire line of 
argument about causation is evidence in-fact of the trial court's errors. 
Holmes clearly presented evidence and argued the causation issue before 
the trial court. (R. at 81-88,78-146; T. at 27.) Specifically, Holmes argued that 
"but for First American's negligence and breach of its contractual obligations, 
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Keystone could not have pursued its lawsuit and Holmes would not have been 
prevented from selling its lots and improving on its investment." (R. at 84, 
paragraph 16; T. at 27.)2 Holmes made similar arguments in its Brief, despite 
assertions to the contrary by First American. Holmes' Brief argues that the 
Warranty Deed prepared by First American and signed by Cook did not convey 
title to Holmes. (Holmes' Brief, p. 12.) Holmes further argued that this defect 
and the subsequent defect in the flawed Special Warranty Deed that First 
American prepared opened the door for Keystone to lay siege to Holmes' title. 
(Holmes' Brief, p. 14.) Similar references to causation are laced throughout 
Holmes' Brief. (Holmes' Brief, p. 16,17, 21, 23.) 
In short, Holmes' arguments demonstrate a dispute of fact regarding 
causation that was erroneously resolved by the trial court in First American's 
favor. By ruling for First American, the trial court resolved a material question of 
fact through summary judgment and that error must be reversed. 
Additional statements of fact further show that Holmes argued before the trial 
court that First American's mistakes were the cause of Holmes' damages. (R. at 84, 
paragraphs 17 and 18.) 
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B. Cook Proximately Caused Holmes' Damages by Selling Property it Did 
Not Own and in Signing Warranty and Special Warranty Deeds That 
Were Flawed and Did Not Properly Convey Title to Holmes. 
Cook also argues that it did not cause Holmes' damages and that Holmes 
failed to meet its burden in briefing or demonstrating that Cook was a proximate 
cause of Holmes' damages. To the contrary, Holmes properly argued at the trial 
court that Cook was a proximate cause of Holmes' damages. (R. at 165-66,236; 
T. at 31-33.) 
The same legal arguments discussed above in response to First American's 
Brief apply to Cook. Cook signed a Warranty Deed that did not convey title to 
Holmes as promised. (R. at 164, 166, 196.) Cook then, in concert with First 
American's request, signed yet another deed, this time a Special Warranty Deed, 
in an effort to correct the errors perpetuated by the previous deeds to Cook and 
then to Holmes. (R. at 166.) In the Keystone litigation, Cook further attempted to 
correct the previous errors by executing and recording a corrective affidavit 
wherein he outlined his intentions with respect to the previous deeds. (R. at 130-
37.) Cook does not dispute that the Special Warranty Deed contained an error. 
(R. at 166.) Nevertheless, Cook and First American ignore this fact and argue that 
their successful defense of Holmes' title acts as a magic wand and erases, as a 
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matter of law, the intervening 8 months wherein Holmes was unable to market or 
sell lots. 
The analogy is simple and logical. The successful defense of Holmes' title 
and the eventual judicial validation of the Special Warranty Deed by a court of 
law did not restore Holmes to the status quo. It did not give back to Holmes the 
intervening eight (8) months where it could not sell lots, thereby losing profits, 
sales and momentum. 
The need for the Special Warranty Deed and the subsequent litigation, lis 
pendens and corrective affidavit would have never arisen had First American and 
Cook not erred in conveying title to Holmes. Also, Cook and First American 
cannot point to any legal authority that allows them to escape the consequences of 
their actions simply because Holmes' title was successfully defended. That 
argument may have merit for First American insofar as its obligations under the 
title insurance policy may be concerned but it does not absolve Cook or First 
American for their breach of the contractual duties each owed to Holmes by virtue 
of obligations each assumed outside and beyond the title insurance policy. These 
additional duties are discussed below in greater detail.3 
3The successful defense of Holmes' title cures but one of the five warranties Cook 
gave to Holmes in the Warranty Deed. Holmes established before the trial court and in its 
initial Brief that the other warranties given to Holmes (in addition to the promise to 
defend) were breached and have yet to be cured. (R. at 235-39; Holmes' Brief, 33-37.) 
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The definition of proximate cause is well known. 
"Proximate cause is 'that cause which, in natural and continuous 
sequence, (unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces the 
injury and without which the result would not have occurred. It is the 
efficient cause-the one that necessarily sets in operation the factors 
that accomplish the injury.'" 
Steffensen. 820 P.2d at 486 (citations omitted). 
Here, the perpetual chain of errors that caused Holmes' damages began 
when First American negligently prepared a deed that Cook signed in an effort to 
convey property owned by Lake Creek Farms, LLC to Cook. That deed 
undisputedly identified the wrong grantor. (R. at 29-31, 164.) Thereafter, Cook, 
thinking they owned the property when they did not, attempted to convey the 
property to Holmes. Again, First American was involved in this transaction. Id 
The actors are the same and they perpetuated their previous errors and passed 
them on to Holmes. There is no break in the chain of causation. 
Thereafter, when First American discovered its series of errors, it, along 
with Cook, attempted to remedy the fatal flaw in Holmes' title by preparing and 
executing a Special Warranty Deed that contained a clerical error. (R. at 31,166.) 
It was this Special Warranty Deed and the clerical error therein (along with 
previous infective conveyances) that Keystone specifically exploited in its legal 
action adverse to Holmes' title. (R. 63-77,123-37.) For the sake of argument, 
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Holmes agrees that Keystone's efforts to exploit these errors were a cause of 
Holmes' damages. However, but for the errors of Cook and First American, 
Keystone could not have pursued claims adverse to Holmes' title, regardless of its 
motivation. Holmes argues that these facts and Cook's errors (along with those of 
First American) are proximate causes of Holmes' damages. (R. at 4-5, paragraphs 
8-10; T. at 31-32.)4 At the very least, the issue of causation is a question for the 
jury, not the trial court. Thompson v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co.. 688 P.2d 
489,491 (Utah 1984). 
II. FIRST AMERICAN AND COOK EACH ASSUMED ADDITIONAL 
CONTRACTUAL DUTIES BEYOND AND IN ADDITION TO THEIR 
OBLIGATIONS PURSUANT TO TITLE INSURANCE AND 
WARRANTIES IN DEEDS. 
First American and Cook each argue on appeal that whatever duties they 
may have owed to Holmes were covered and satisfied by the policy of title 
insurance and by First American's successful defense of Holmes' title by virtue of 
that insurance. Similar arguments were presented to and accepted by the trial 
court. Nevertheless, Holmes has, at each stage of this litigation, argued that both 
4Holmes does not dispute the assertion that the Keystone litigation was without 
merit from its perspective. Nevertheless, Keystone could not have brought its action or 
had colorable legal arguments and claims but for the chain of errors created by First 
American and Cook. Cook and First American opened the door and a less than genuine, 
but cognizable claim in the form of Keystone, walked through. (T. at 28.) 
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Cook and First American assumed and breached additional duties beyond those 
associated with title insurance.5 
A. Cook Assumed the Additional Duty of Indemnification Pursuant to the 
Indemnity Agreements. 
On May 18,1998, Cook and Holmes executed an Indemnity Agreement. In 
the Indemnity Agreement, Cook covenanted to indemnify and hold Holmes 
harmless from: 
[a]ny damage, loss or deficiency resulting from any 
misrepresentation, breach of warranty or nonfulfillment of any 
covenant or agreement on the part of Cook Development under any 
agreement or any other document executed in connection with 
Holmes' purchase of the Covered Property. 
(R. at 180, paragraph (b).) The Indemnity Agreement was executed on the very 
day Holmes consummated its purchase from Cook. Holmes is hard pressed to 
explain, let alone contradict, Cook's unexplainable and vaporous argument that 
this language does not apply to Holmes' damages. Did Cook sign a Warranty 
Deed that did not convey title to Holmes? Yes. (R. at 196-97.) Did Cook sign a 
Special Warranty Deed that contained an error and required litigation and a 
corrective affidavit to validate? Yes. (R. at 123,130-37,199-213.) Cook would 
have this Court accept, as the trial court did, the argument that the provisions of 
5Holmes also maintains that First American breached its contractual obligation 
under the policy of title insurance that requires it to take "appropriate action" in defending 
Holmes' title or in fulfilling its obligations under the title insurance policy. (R. at 85-86.) 
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the Indemnity Agreement were satisfied by the successful defense of Holmes' 
title. However, the clear language of the Indemnity Agreement makes Cook liable 
for "any damage, loss or deficiency" and does not include a disclaimer or 
exception for title insurance. 
Paragraph (a) of the Indemnity Agreement does contain an exception that 
releases Cook from liability situations covered by the title policy. In paragraph (a) 
Cook agrees to indemnify Holmes from: 
Any and all claims that arise from, or are in any way related to, 
Seller's acquisition, ownership or development of the Covered 
Property prior to the date of this Agreement, except for those claims 
covered by the title insurance policy to be purchased pursuant to the 
Purchase Agreement. 
(R. at 180, paragraph (a) (emphasis added).) Had Holmes and Cook desired to 
include the exception found in paragraph (a) of the Indemnity Agreement in 
paragraph (b) it would have been a simple task. Of course, including the title 
insurance exception in paragraph (b) would not have changed matters. The title 
insurance policy does not cover Holmes' damages because First American 
pursued an alternative course in defending title as opposed to indemnifying 
Holmes. (R. at 139-46.) Put in other terms, Cook agreed in paragraph (b) of the 
Indemnity Agreement to indemnify Holmes for any and all damages Holmes 
sustained by virtue of Cook's errors, negligence and breach of warranties 
11 
regardless of whether or not Holmes' damages are covered by the title insurance 
policy.6 (R. at 180.) 
Cook again relies on case law for the proposition that successful defense of 
Holmes' title precludes Holmes from collecting its damages from Cook. Again, 
the Indemnity Agreement says otherwise and is an affirmative covenant assumed 
by Cook. Furthermore, case law in Utah clearly allows parties to collect damages 
they sustain when one or more warranties in deeds of conveyance are breached. 
See Creason v. Peterson. 470 P.2d 403 (Utah 1970); Van Cott v. Jacklin. 226 P. 
460 (Utah 1924).7 
Also, Holmes' Complaint alleges that Cook breached the Indemnity 
Agreement by failing to indemnify Holmes for its damages. (R. at 17, paragraph 
102.) This is a direct "breach of contract" claim. Additionally, Holmes' Second 
6Cook illogically argues that the principle of indemnification applies only to 
damage caused by a third party and does not apply to the indemnitor. (Cook's Appellate 
Brief, p. 27.) However, Cook utterly fails to offer any evidence or support in case law or 
statute for its position. In fact, Black's Law Dictionary defines "indemnify" with the 
following language. "To restore the victim of a loss, in whole or in part . . . . To save 
harmless; to secure against loss or damage " Nothing in Black's Law Dictionary or in 
case law supports the proposition that an indemnitor's obligation to indemnify is triggered 
only when the loss is caused by someone other than the indemnitor. 
7Cook gallantly attempts, but fails to distinguish Creason and Van Cott. Both 
stand for the proposition that where there has been a breach of warranty, the grantee is 
entitled to recover "the damage he suffers as a result of the breach thereof. " Creason. 470 
P.2d at 404. Neither Creason or Van Cott restrict the recoverable damages to only those 
situations where the grantee actually loses a portion of what he or she purchased. 
12 
Cause of Action references both direct breach of contract claims against First 
American and Cook as well as indirect third party beneficiary claims. (R. at 15.) 
Specifically, Holmes' Complaint references the breach of contract that occurred 
with the preparation, execution and recording of the Warranty Deed signed by 
Cook and designed to convey title directly to Holmes. (R. at 15, paragraph 86.) 
These questions of fact simply cannot be resolved through summary judgment and 
the trial court clearly erred when it did just that.8 
In short, Cook assumed several duties. Warranties were given through two 
different deeds. The second Special Warranty Deed was specifically used in the 
context of Holmes' efforts to procure financing. (R. at 31, 84-85, 130-37,165-
66.) Holmes is entitled to recover its damages under the breach of warranty issues 
alone. However, Holmes is also entitled to indemnification for "any damage, loss 
or deficiency" Holmes sustains by virtue of Cook's misrepresentations. (R. at 
180.) Holmes' Complaint and the arguments it presented to the trial court are 
8Both Cook and First American argue that Holmes' Complaint says nothing about 
breach of contract claims and, instead, refers only to breaches in the third party 
beneficiary context. Perhaps Holmes' claims are not artfully pled or as clear as they 
could be. However, direct breach of contract claims are referenced in Holmes' Complaint 
and, when coupled with Holmes' arguments in opposition to Defendants' motions to 
dismiss and Holmes' request and motion to amend its Complaint, clearly place the trial 
court and the parties on notice of Holmes' claims. 
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clear and unmistakable on this issue. Either way, Cook is liable for Holmes' 
damages even though title was eventually quieted in Holmes. 
B. First American Performed Additional Work Outside of the Title Policy 
for Holmes, Thereby Assuming Additional Duties That Were Breached 
When First American Erred in Preparing Deeds. 
Had First American simply issued a title insurance commitment report and 
title insurance in the transaction between Holmes and Cook, its arguments would 
have some merit. However, First American ignores the meaningful evidence and 
clear questions of fact presented by Holmes' arguments before the trial court and 
in its initial Brief. Specifically, First American conducted the closing and 
prepared and recorded deeds, activities that are clearly separate and apart from the 
issuance of title insurance. (R. at 30-31, 119-21,123-28,130-37.) 
First American would have this court accept the same illogical argument 
that the trial court accepted, which is that the additional services performed by 
First American for a profit are nevertheless gratuitous and fall under the protective 
umbrella of title insurance. Cook and Holmes did not have to use First American 
for the closing. They could have had their own legal counsel prepare the deeds 
and handle the closing. This would have been a logical approach because the 
preparation of documents that fix legal relationships between parties constitutes 
the practice of law. Utah State Bar v. Summerhayes & Hayden Pub. Adjusters. 
14 
905 P.2d 867, 870 (Utah 1995). Even if the preparation of deeds does not 
constitute the practice of law (a point Holmes does not concede), preparing deeds 
in a professional capacity, either gratuitously or for a fee, brings with that service 
the duty to do so in a competent and professional manner.9 
Holmes' argument on this point is simple and ignored by First American. 
The settlement statement shows that First American charged Holmes and Cook 
$300.00 each for settlement and closing fees (R. at 120, line 1101), $120.00 to 
Cook for releases and $15.00 to Holmes (R. at 120, line 1201), for recording an 
ineffective and worthless Warranty Deed in violation of the law (R. at 90, n.5). 
See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-20-110(a) (Supp. 1985) Even though it feels justified 
in charging these fees, First American argues that the services it rendered merit 
charging a fee to the parties to the transaction. It then goes on to argue that 
9First American cannot argue that its failure to charge for the preparation of the 
Warranty Deed signed by Cook at closing was gratuitous and that it had no duty to 
prepare the deed in a competent and professional manner. Utah law regularly and 
consistently holds volunteers or gratuitous providers of services liable when they breach 
the duties that attach in that process. See Hansen v. Oregon Short Line R.R. Co.. 55 Utah 
577, 582,188 P. 852, 854 (1920) (carrier held liable for damages to non-paying 
passenger); Warren v. Robison.19 Utah 289, 300, 57 P. 287, 290 (1899) (the duties 
attached to service as an officer or director of a corporation may not be avoided because 
the officer or director served gratuitously and without compensation). First American 
also fails to refer to the Utah Liability Protection for Volunteers Act (the "Act") found at 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-19-1. Of course, this statutory exception to the general rule 
that duties of care and liability for the breach of those duties attach even in situations 
where payment occurs does not help First American. The Act only applies to non-profit 
entities and other individuals performing services for non-profit corporations or entities. 
It has no application here. 
15 
despite these charges, it did not charge the parties for deed or document 
preparation. It is less than genuine for First American to argue that it is 
nevertheless immune from criticism or suit because it also sold the parties title 
insurance and successfully defended a challenge to Holmes' title. 
In short, First American wore two hats in the transaction. It insured title 
and, for a fee, assisted the parties in closing the transaction. Even if First 
American performed all of these services free of charge and simply out of courtesy 
as a reward for purchasing title insurance, a mere volunteer may still be held liable 
for its mistakes and form a contractual relationship even when no fees are 
assessed. At the very least, a question of fact is presented by the charges assessed 
by First American. 
III. HOLMES CLEARLY MOVED FOR LEAVE TO AMEND ITS 
COMPLAINT AND COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
RULES 7 AND 15 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
In Utah, "[the Rules of Civil Procedure] must all be read in the light of their 
fundamental purpose of both pleading and procedure to the end that the parties are 
afforded the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have 
pertaining to their dispute." Timm v. Dewsnup. 851 P.2d 1178,1183 (Utah 1993) 
(quoting Chenev v. Rucker. 14 Utah 2d 205,211,381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963)). The 
Utah Supreme Court also stated more specifically that '"[t]he policy of the law is 
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toward liberality in the allowance of amendments and to icgaid tin m l,i\ uiabl> in 
order that the real controversy between the pt , >resented, their rights 
determined, and the cause decide :, .* Johnson v. Brinkerhoff. 89 Utah 
530, 538- •• .,. 
i'. Itah Rules of Civil Procedure is also important in this 
analyse U Mates that: 
[a]n application to the court for an order shall be made by motion 
which, unless made during a hearing or trial, shall be made in writing, 
shall state with particularity the grounds therefore, and shall set forth 
the relief or order sought. The requirement of writing is fulfilled if 
the motion is stated in a written notice of the hearing of the motion. 
(emphasis added). Here, Holmes i npit sit A Irnvc of court to amend its complaint. 
Point III of Holm* of Points and Authorities in Opposition to First 
Amen-. an Moli< ni " > Dismiss is devoted entirely to Holmes' request to amend its 
Complaint <K at 92.) Holmes also requested the same opportunity 1o aincml in 
its Memorandum in Opposition to Cook's Motion to Dismiss. .) 
Holmes admits that it did not file a separate pleading l!>;*• was labeled as a 
"Motion." Holmes also admits thai n ' of the amended complaint 
in conjunction witn menu. However, no such 
requirements arc ither Rule 7 or 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
h IHTIIIIM lii f';i< I Rule 7(b)(1) allows aparty to avoid the requirement of a 
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writing simply by making the motion during "a hearing or trial." This Holmes 
did. Holmes specifically referenced its desire to amend its Complaint in the 
hearing held on First American's and Cook's motions to dismiss. (T. at 27.) 
The Utah Supreme Court errs in favor of allowing amendments despite the 
fact that, at times, the manner in which leave of court is sought is less than artfully 
pled. 
Some tempest has been raised about the court allowing the plaintiff to 
make tardy amendments to the pleadings The pleadings are never 
more important than the case that is before the court There can be 
no prejudice in this case because we'll give ample time for an answer. 
. . . This is in harmony with what we regard as the correct policy: of 
recognizing the desirability of the pleadings setting forth definitely 
framed issues, but also of permitting amendment where the interest of 
justice so requires, and the adverse party is given a fair opportunity to 
meet it. 
Lewis v. Moultree. 627 P.2d 94, 98 (Utah 1981) (quoting Thomas J. Peck & Sons. 
Inc. v. Lee Rock Products. Inc.. 30 Utah 2d 187, 193, 515 P.2d 446, 449-50 
(1973)). 
The argument that Holmes did not offer sufficient detail about what it 
would do if allowed to amend its Complaint is also less than genuine. In Point III 
of its Memorandum in Opposition to First American's Motion to Dismiss, Holmes 
clearly refers to the arguments and positions identified in detail in the body of its 
opposing memorandum. (R. at 92.) Those arguments are arguably part of 
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Holmes' Complaint, but would have been clarified and more ; > 
include the claims that First American and Cook assun u contractual 
duties beyond those associated with th y and deeds and that 
they breached those obligations. 
In short,: >. k • 1111,111 < i i 'ook cannot point to any prejudice that would 
have on by the trial court to allow Holmes leave to amend its 
v discovery had taken place. There was no established in;il dale. 
'•^  trial court, First American and Cook were all clearly aw.n e < >l Holnu's' 
request to amend prior to and during the hearing. 11' .i' l l ^7, I :ii ,'7.) In fact, 
nothing had occurred beyond the filing o •: nplaint and the Defendants' 
respective motions to dismiss ' iiiii -i iiitialrly. the trial court ignored Holmes' 
arguments and chose in i »a*)i a rather harsh and abrupt conclusion that deprived 
Holme:-, ol llu oppiiwiiiiv to be heard and its grievances addressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Holmes' request for relief on appeal is simple, 
heard and considered before the same is dismisses I < H I I I 11" First American 
and Cook made mistakes that damaged hat much is not in dispute. 
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Holmes respectfully requests this Court to reverse the trial court's orders granting 
summary judgment and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. 
Dated this &£ day of May, 2001 
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE 
Barry N. Johnsoni, 
Daniel L. Steele 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Appellant Holmes Development, LLC 
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